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tacitly ignored. A fairer impression of our law would have been given had
Professor Corbin cited the later case of Robinson v. Graves1i which shows
that the modern English doctrine is very much that for which he argues.
Before concluding perhaps I may venture upon one suggestion for the
second edition which will undoubtedly be called for shortly. It seems to me
that the practical utility of the work would be still further increased if each
volume had its own Index and Table of Cases in addition to the consolidated
-Index and Tables in Volumes Seven and Eight. I can well understand that,
having accomplished the amazing achievement of producing the whole work at
one time, Professor Corbin is anxious to emphasize its essential unity. Never-
theless it would be valuable, especially to the practitioner, if each Volume could
be used, for example in Court, on its own.
On reading the foregoing I am acutely aware that it is all too inadequate
an appreciation of a major work of legal scholarship. My excuse must be
that of a great English lawyer and jurist, Lord Wright, in commenting on
the equivalent sections of Williston's book.10 "I confess," he said, "that I
found it, however ably and brilliantly done, somewhat depressing. There is
no principle involved. It is all directed to construing badly drawn and ill-
planned sections of a statute which was an extraneous excrescence on the
Common Law. . . ." It is the great strength of Corbin's treatment that he
almost succeeds in concealing that "it is all devoted to ... badly drawn and
ill-planned sections" and in persuading the reader that there is some principle.
But not even he can make the Statute of Frauds a really thrilling or fascinat-
ing chapter in our legal story. Had your Editor entrusted me with the volume
on Mistake or Frustration then indeed I might have been able to do myself,
and Professor Corbin, better justice, but I can well understand that the
competition was keen and that charity begins at home. So this review must
end, as it began, with envy-this time of the deservedly fortunate champions
among whom I am privileged to offer this very humble but very sincere
tribute.
L. C. B. GOwERt
VOLUME THREE
PART III: INTERPRETATION-PARoL EvmENCE-MISTAKE §§ 532-621.
PATIENT genius made this book. A first class legal education could rest
largely on Corbin's 95 page discussion of the so-called "parol evidence rule."1
14. § 476, p. 623.
15. [1935] 1 K.B. 579.
16. Wright, Williston on Contracts, 55 L.Q. REv. 189, 204-5 (1939).
t Professor of Law, London School of Economics.
1. For that discussion does not, remaining on the aloof, relatively calm, upper court
level, content itself with an exposition of legal rules and their complexities. It also refers
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His Part III alone entitles him to lasting fame. Press of work prevents my
doing it justice at this time, and I shall therefore limit myself here to sketching
a few impressionistic responses.
Corbin, here as everywhere, shows up not only as an exquisitely nice legal
analyst but also as a philosopher and wise student of society. More, he has a
poetic imagination, a sensitive awareness of the individual human beings in-
volved in law suits, and an eagerness that their unique sayings and doings shall
not be ignored. His interest is in having justice done in each case, not
in contriving a neat system of rules to satisfy the lazy or those with such
callow sensibilities that only smooth-flowing harmonies satisfy them.
In the pages here under scrutiny, Corbin explores the legal aspects of one
of mankind's most baffling problems-that of communication. Because he
has philosophic and poetic insights, this part of his treatise should be studied
by all who, in legal and other fields, concern themselves with that problem.
He begins by saying, "Interpretation is the process whereby one person gives
a meaning to the symbols of expression used by another person."2 This opens
up the question whether communication can ever be perfect, or (as we some-
times put it) whether a man's words ever have a completely discoverable
"objective" meaning. Corbin warns that such perfection is seldom attainable,
that there exist no devices which "will infallibly lead to one correct understand-
ing and meaning," because, in dealing with others' words, "men certainly see
through a glass, darkly." Of a writer who maintained that there is "only one true
meaning of any particular group of words," Corbin says that the trouble is
that there is no "one true meaning" of the phrase "one true meaning."3 For
"language at its best is always a defective and uncertain instrument,"4 and
"words do not define themselves."
A 14th century civilian lawyer, Lucas De Penna,-' warned against "bold
and rash interpretations which neglect the text," while he exposed the ill-
effects of mechanical literal interpretation; he pointed to the dangers in the
"isolation of words from their context," maintained that words are but
"vehicles of expression," and scorned those who thought that interpretation
consists solely of "finding dictionary equivalents" for the words men use.
4 b
repeatedly to the more turbulent trial court level: it points out, again and again, that
legal rules cannot exclude oral testimony, so that most decisions turn on the reactions
of trial judges or juries to disagreeing orally-testifying witnesses.
2. § 532, p. 2.
3. § 835, p. 16 n. 18.
4. Compare the popular notion of the uncertain consequences of contractual language
at least when confined to an oral exchange between the parties: "A verbal cuntract isn't
worth the paper it's written on." Collector's Item, a play by Lillian Day and Alfred
Golden.
4a. ULLaSAN, TaE fFDiVAL IDEA OF LAW AS REPRESENTED BY LucAs DE PENNA,
21, 113, 114, 120; see also 43, 121-2 (1946).
4b. Judge Learned Hand has said that it is "one of the surest indexes of a mature
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary.... ." Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
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In 1816 Mr. Justice Johnson said, in a dissenting opinion," "Language
is essentially defective in expression; more so than those are aware of, who
are not in the habit of subjecting it to philological analysis." More than a
century later, Max Radin, noting that lawyers, often unwittingly, practice
philology every day, went on to remark:
"Philologers may love words but they do not venerate them, nor very
much respect them. And above all, they are not afraid of them. Now,
no one is really more afraid of a word than a lawyer, unless it is an exact
scientist. Both have a dread of what may be contained in the few
syllables of the words they use, a fear which is only equalled by some
tribes of primitive men. If lawyers had the experience of philological
training, they would know words for what they are, and would not
hang desperately on a wretched explosion of breath when their task
required them to do justice between man and man."
Corbin has sloughed off the fear Radin described. "The less one knows,"
Corbin writes, "about the history and evolution of language, the more likely
he is to suppose that he knows the 'true meaning' of words, and the more
likely he is to hold that the words of the contracting parties have a 'plain and
clear' meaning.' 7 Elsewhere he says, "Words have no meaning; it is users
who give them meaning.' 8 He observes "that to elucidate the meaning of
the word 'mean' requires fourteen long columns of fine print in the Oxford
Dictionary."9
Corbin is in substantial accord with those who recognize that communication
"is and must always be an approximation," since "a man talks out of a private
world of his own," each man taking every word "into his own consciousness
ringed about with a special context of associations, differing from the associa-
tions of everyone else hearing it," so that our "speech is a compromise between
the ultimate incommunicability of one person with another and the conven-
tional communication values attached to certain symbols." 10
Corbin's stress on the obstacles to perfect communication stems, however,
from no smart-aleck desire to "draw the cork out of an old conundrum, and
watch the paradoxes fizz."11 He aims to persuade judges that, often, interpre-
tation of other men's words calls for the most painstaking inquiry.
5. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 374 (U.S. 1816).
6. Radin, A Jiwter Justice, A More Lawful Law in EssAys IN HoNOR oF" ORRiN,
KIm McMuRRAY 537 (1935).
7. § 579, p. 256.
8. § 540, p. 58 n. 65.
9. § 542, p. 70 n. 83.
10. ScHLAUCH, THE GiFT OF TONGUES 113 (1942).
Dr. Allan Gregg suggests "that man is the only animal whose means of communication
have grown so complicated that he frequently conveys ideas which he never had in mnd
at all." Commencement Address delivered at the Jefferson Medical College on March 4,
1943.
11. MacNeice, Goodbye Now, Plato and Hegel in AUTUMN JOURNAL 51 (1939),
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The judges should be willing to heed Corbin, as every judge frequently finds
with dismay that his own personal utterances have been misunderstood by
lawyers or other judges. To be sure, some of these misunderstandings derive
from inevitable elliptical expressions.' 2 For, as Jesperson notes, "only bores
want to express everything, but even bores find it impossible... .'3 Some-
times judges resent-on occasions, justifiably-the lawyers' misinterpretation
of their opinions. 14 The judges should remember that resentment when they
seek to interpret what laymen have said.
As part of his campaign for improved efforts by judges to understand liti-
gants' language, Corbin courageously criticizes the mighty: he dares vigorously
to attack what he considers mistaken notions voiced by Holmes,'" Cardozo206
and Learned Hand.'7 He even goes so far as to suggest that these great judges
sometimes expressed themselves with avoidable ambiguity. Corbin also ven-
tures to criticize parts of the Contracts Restatcment; his criticisms bite but
are kindlier than Leach's recent statement, vis-A-vis another Restatement,
that the A.L.I. "forbade criticism of existing law and even encouraged
'rationales' for rules which no one connected with the enterprise considered
sound," as a consequence of which "the Restatement is a compendium of case
law as it is, including all its mistakes. .... 8
Referring to the job of a judge who tries to comprehend the writings of
other men, Corbin comments:
12. Cf. § 568, p. 197. "It is the universal custom of mankind to speak elliptically and
to assume the existence and the understanding of things not expressed in words."
13. JEspFmsox, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 309 (1924).
14. See, e.g., United Shipyards, Inc. v. Hoey, 131 F.2d 525, 526-7 (2d Cir. 1942):
"It would be time-saving if we had a descriptive catalogue of recurrent types of fallacies
encountered in arguments addressed to the courts, giving each of them a number, scv
that, in a particular case, we could say, 'This is an instance of Fallacy No. -. ' Such
a device would be helpful here. For the fallacy of the appellee's argument is of a familiar
kind: In formulating the reasons for their decisions, judges often adopt rulings made
in previous decisions in which the facts were somewhat similar, saying, in effect, 'This
situation is sufficiently like those which we have previously considered so that we can
disregard the differences and restrict ourselves to the resemblances.' And, thus ignoring
-for the purposes immediately at hand-the unlikenesses, the situations are, frequently,
spoken of as identical. But elliptical discussions of cases partly alike, as if there were
complete identity, is merely for convenience. There is present, although it may be un-
expressed, an 'as if,' a 'let's pretend'-a simile or metaphor. Such 'as if' or metaphorical
thinking is invaluable in all provinces of thought (not excepting that of science). How-
ever, some of the greatest errors in thinking have arisen from the mechanical, unreflec-
tive, application of old formulations-forgetful of a tacit 'as if'-to new situations which
are sufficiently discrepant from the old so that the emphasis on the likenesses is mislead-
ing and the neglect of the differences leads to unfortunate or foolish consequences."
15. § 544, p. 84 n. 96, § 579 pp. 253- 4 .
16. § 536, pp. 20-21 n. 20.
17. § 537, p. 32 n. 32, § 533 p. 46 n. 53, p. 47 n. 54, § 539, pp. 51-2 n. SS, § 542, p. 0,9
n. 83.
18. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective, 65 HAv. L. REv. 721, 747 (1952.
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"It is conceivable that .. the best that a judge can do is to put himself
so far as possible in the position of that person or persons, knowing
their history and experience and their relations with other men and
things, and then to determine what his own meaning and intention
would have been. To do this requires a lively imagination, full and
complete information obtained from the document and extrinsic testi-
mony, and ...sound judgment and common sense."'1
Those sentences contain a whole philosophy of criticism-applicable, within
the legal realm, to contracts or wills or statutes, and, outside the legal realm,
to history, philosophy, biography, autobiography, essays, poetry, fiction, and
the fine arts in general.
You'll see at once the bearing of his theory on the attitude of that legal
school which inveighs against the use of "legislative history." But it bears
also on the very similar attitude of that school of literary critics which rejects
the biographical approach to poetry, urging that the poem is the thing, not its
context in the life or the times of the poet.20 When such literary critics de-
mand that readers concentrate on Shelley's poems and forget his love affairs,
they sound much like those lawyers and judges who want to dwell on the
text of a statute and forget its context.21 Few literary or legal critics carry
out such an attitude to its logical (or illogical) extreme. 22 But those who
tend too far in that direction would do well to listen to Corbin's warning:
"A word, appearing suddenly, in empty space and with no history, would
express nothing at all. To be expressive of any meaning, all words must have
a context and a history .... -23
No matter of what school, intelligent literary critics assert, as does Corbin,
that the critic--i.e., one who judges-must have a "lively imagination." But
where, in any other solemn legal treatise on such a subject as "Contracts" will
you see it asserted that the judicial judge-the critic on the bench-should
be vitally imaginative, an artist, if you please, quick with empathy, the capacity
to feel himself into the minds and moods of other men?
It is Corbin's own lively imagination, his artistry, his "critical tact," that
lends to his work its enduring worth. Not the least valuable product of this
19. § 536, p. 23. The reader will perceive the Aristotelian note in the suggestion that
the judge "determine what his own meaning and intention would have been."
20. See, e.g., London Times, Literary Supplement, Dec. 14, 1951: "There is a cot-
temporary school of critics which likes to insist that the biographical approach to poetry
is a waste of time, or worse. All that we need to know about a poem, it is claimed, is
there on the printed page; and to interest ourselves in the poet's life, or character, or
motives, or intentions is to get away from what the poem says, and may even lead us to
prejudge the poem and approach it with irrelevant considerations in mind."
21. This is a theme I hope someday soon to expand.
22. See, e.g., the avowals in the "1950 Postscript" to BROOKS AND WAmN, UNDR-
STANDING POETRY XX-XVi (1951).
23. § 540, p. 57.
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quality is Corbin's insistence that able judges cannot live by rules alone.
Rules (one learns from Corbin) nudge the judge, give him hints, strong hints
he must seldom disregard; but a judge who knows nothing but the rules will
be a judicial routineer, a dispenser of injustice, since (as Corbin teaches) the
art of judging really lies in the ability to cope with the unruly.2-
JEROME FRANI4
PART IV: CONSTRUCTION AND LEGAL OPERATION OF CONmTRACT-CODITIONS
OF LEGAL DUTY §§ 622-771.
To review Corbin on Contracts was a pleasure long hoped for,1 and in the
event it was to this reviewer richly rewarding. Here is a work that expresses
the meditation and the wisdom, the insights and the subtleties of one of
America's pre-eminent legal scholars--expresses it with clarity and candor,
with caution and modesty and in a graceful style. Legal literature can be
useful without being dull. The counselor will find here recognition of his
need for the predictive use of law, the judge will find that the difficulties of
deciding concrete and complex cases by the use of legal tools have been stated
and simplified and the law teacher will see new meanings in the old standby
cases which he has taught many times.2 The chief danger of their using it as
a reference work is that they will be beguiled into reading it straight through,
as one does a novel. Exposition at its best can be more exciting than narrative.
The portion of the work assigned to this reviewer deals with many of the
most important problems of the performance stage of contracts: express and
constructive conditions, entire and divisible contracts, peculiar constructions
of aleatory contracts, "conditions subsequent," and waiver or prevention as
ways of eliminating the effects of conditions. Professor Corbin was chiefly
responsible for the introduction of the term, "constructive condition," now
used in the Restateinent of Contracts,3 to supplant the old, ambiguous "implied
condition." This shift in terminology has helped judges in the present
century to realize that when troubles arise in the performance stage of a contract,
what is called for is not merely an exegesis of the language in the contract-
though this is not to be disregarded-but also a constructive evaluation of the
24. See, e.g., § 543, p. 76: "In the process of interpretation, it is the court and not
the parties who should be reasonably or even remarkably intelligent."
tCircuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
1. In reviewing CoRiN's Axso.N o CoNTRACTS (5th Amer. ed. 1930), I expressed
the hope that Professor Corbin would produce his own treatise, 18 VA. L RLv. 343, 349
(1932).
2. E.g., the exposition of Constable v. Cloberie, § 633, p. 522.
3. REsTAr hE:NT, CoNTPAcrs § 253 (1932).
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